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CASE NOTES
respect to the FTC.° 2 In Alkali, the Supreme Court recognized the power of
the Department of Justice to institute antitrust suits in the federal courts
without initial recourse to the FTC.° However, this power was recognized
only as an answer to Alkali's motion to dismiss a Justice Department com-
plaint on the ground that the FTC had primary juridiction." The question
has yet to be answered as to who will be granted primary jurisdiction when
the FTC issues a complaint at the same time that an action is instituted in
a district court. Dean would indicate that the Supreme Court may now favor
the FTC in such a conflict. Since the Court in Dean went out of its way in
using the All Writs Act to grant to the FTC powers equal to those of the
Justice Department, it would seem unreasonable to predict that the Court
would place the FTC in a position inferior to the Justice Department in a
primary jurisdiction fight. Furthermore, Dean required an implicit decision
on the relative powers of the FTC and the Justice Department, since Dean
effectively granted to the FTC full power to hear all merger cases within its
jurisdiction without prior recourse to the Justice Department. This same
type of decision, though in a different context, will have to be made to de-
termine whether the FTC or the district courts have primary jurisdiction.
There is no apparent reason why the Court will not again favor the FTC.
There is no doubt that the Court in Dean did show a favorable atti-
tude toward the FTC. Although there was sufficient precedent for the Court
to invoke the All Writs Act prior to an adjudication by a lower tribunal, the
Court could have easily distinguished Dean from these previous cases on the
basis of both Dean's unique fact situation and the implications of Sections
15 and 16 of the Clayton Act. The fact that the Court did not choose to
do so, but provided the FTC with more extensive power, reaffirms the strict
anti-merger policy the Court has demonstrated in recent years.
POLES A. CHAMPY
Trade Regulation—Concerted Refusal to Deal—Association's Exclusion
of Licensed Realtor from Listing Pool—Grillo v. Board of Realtors.'—
Defendants in this action are a nonprofit corporation 2 and its individual
member realtors. The corporation operates a "listing pool" in the Plainfield,
New Jersey area. The "listing pool" is a system whereby any residential
82 3 Davis, Administrative Law § 19.05, at 23-24 n.1 (1958).
63 During the twenty-eight years between the enactment of the Sherman Act
and the passage of the Webb-Pomerene Act, the plenary authority and settled
practice of the Department of Justice to institute antitrust suits, without prior
proceedings by other agencies, became firmly established. A pro tanto repeal of
that authority, by conferring upon the Commission primary jurisdiction to
determine when, if at all, an antitrust suit may be appropriately brought, would
require a clear expression of that purpose by Congress.
325 U.S. at 205-06.
64 Id. at 198.
91 N.J. Super. 202, 219 A.2d 635 (1966).
2 The defendant board is a member of the National Association of Real Estate
Boards and is affiliated with the New Jersey Association of Real Estate Boards.
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property of less than four units which is listed with a board member is listed
with all member realtors. Any board member may then show the listed prop-
erty and consummate its sale. When a property is sold the commission is
divided: twenty per cent to the listing realtor, seventy-five per cent to the
selling realtor, and five per cent to the board to cover its expenses. Partici-
pation by realtors who are not members of the board is limited to referral
of prospects to members. If a sale is consummated as a result of such a
referral, the selling realtor pays thirty per cent of his seventy-five per cent
commission to the referring realtor. The rules prohibiting direct participation
by nonmembers are actively enforced by the board.
In order to be a candidate for admission to the board, a licensed realtor
must have been active in a firm in the Plainfield area for at least one year.
Even a qualified candidate may be rejected by a vote of the members with-
out a hearing or explanation. The initiation fee is one thousand dollars. 3
The plaintiff, having unsuccessfully applied for admission to the board
several times over an eight-year period, sought to enjoin his continued ex-
clusion and asked damages for the previous rejections. He contended that
by excluding him from the benefits of the listing pool the board had com-
mitted a tort against his business and had acted in restraint of trade. The
defendant answered that the plaintiff had not met the ethical standards that
were required of a candidate and that his exclusion was, therefore, reason-
able under the circumstances. 4 HELD: The exclusion of a licensed realtor
from the listing pool was unreasonable because it was an attempt to enforce
extra-governmental standards in a fully-regulated field. Such an exclusion
is both a tort and a restraint of trade. Nine thousand dollars in damages
were awarded,5 and an injunction was issued ordering the board to change
the rules of the listing pool so that any licensed broker in the Plainfield area
could participate on the same basis as a board member.
The court's decision was composed of three major points. First, partici-
pation in the listing pool was necessary to compete successfully in the sale
of residential real estate in the Plainfield area. Second, for that reason, the
3 The one-year waiting period, the $1,000 initiation fee, and the exclusion of licensed
brokers by secret vote were the particular restrictions on membership with which the
court was concerned. 91 N.J. Super. at 211, 219 A.2d at 640. Other considerations, such
as the exclusion of realtors not in the area, were not in issue on the facts. Id. at 229-30,
219 A.2d at 651.
4 The National Association promulgates the "Realtor Code of Ethics" which is
observed by the members of local boards. To show that the plaintiff did not meet their
ethical standards, the defendants submitted evidence that the plaintiff had made advances
upon women while in their homes in his professional capacity. Brief for Defendant,
pp. 5-7. Since the court prohibited the exclusion of any licensed realtor from member-
ship in the listing pool, it did not reach this question. 91 N.J. Super. at 225, 219 A.2d
at 648.
5 The plaintiff submitted no evidence of actual damages, but, since injury had
been proven, the court awarded the average profit realized from the listing pool by board
members over the years of plaintiff's exclusion. Id. at 230-32, 219 A.2d at 651-52. The
basis for the award was highly speculative and probably did not represent actual loss.
The plaintiff presumably concentrated on obtaining and selling his own listings and
so mitigated the damages. In addition, some of the listings obtained by the plaintiff
would have been sold by other board members, reducing the plaintiff's profit.
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exclusion of plaintiff was prima facie a tort and a restraint of trade. Third,
the exclusion could not be justified as a means of enforcing the board's ethical
standards. An analysis of these points shows the danger in permitting private
trade or professional associations to exclude competitors in the same field
from functions which are essential to competition on an equal basis with
members.
Underlying the plaintiff's cause of action against the board was the fact
that it was an economic necessity for a realtor in the Plainfield area to par-
ticipate in the listing pool. Unless exclusion from a private association di-
rectly affects an individual's capacity to compete with those who enjoy its
benefits, the court will have no basis to intervene.° The right to choose one's
associates is not absolute, and must give way when the collective strength
of the association is such that it has gained some kind of control over a
field.? In such a case, the courts will intervene to ensure that the benefits
of that power are extended to all competitors on an equal basis and that no
competitive imbalance results .°
Having concluded that exclusion from the benefits of the listing pool
caused a diminution of the plaintiff's competitive opportunity, the court
characterized this injury both as the tort of concerted refusal to deal,° and
as a common law restraint of trade. 1° The court treated these two causes
of action separately, as if they were two different forms of unlawful business
conduct. It is submitted, however, that there is no difference between a
cause of action based on the tort of concerted refusal to deal and one based
on a common law restraint of trade. The elements of the two causes of
action, and the interests to be considered, are identical.
The elements of a restraint of trade at common law are (1) a conspiracy
or combination to reduce competition, which (2) injures the public (3) un-
0 Harris v. Thomas, 217 S.W. 1068 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920). See generally Develop-
ments in the Law—Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations, 76 Harv. L.
Rev. 983, 990-98 (1963).
7 Developments in the Law—Competitive Torts, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 888, 931 (1964).
See Chafee, Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 993, 1022
(1930). See also Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963) (stock exchange
ordering removal of wire service to nonmember dealers in unlisted securities); Radiant
Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961) (withholding
association seal of approval from competing products); Falcone v. Middlesex sCounty
Medical Soc'y, 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791 (1961) (secondary boycott of nonmember
physicians by accrediting only those hospitals which restricted their staffs to association
members).
8 Monopoly has been defined in terms of control over a field and exclusion of
competitors in the exercise of that control. United States v. National Retail Lumber
Dealer's Ass'n, 40 F. Supp. 448, 456 (D. Colo. 1941); Goldsmith v. Mead Johnson &
Co., 176 Md. 682, 688, 7 A.2d 176, 179 (1939).
9 See Restatement, Torts § 765 (1939).
10 The New Jersey antitrust statute applies solely to corporate mergers and acquisi-
tions. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14:3-10 (1939). Thus, the plaintiff was confined to a common
law restraint of trade cause of action. For a resolution of similar problems under a
statute, see Group Health Coop. v. King County Medical Soc'y, 39 Wash. 2d 586, 237
P.2d 737 (1957). In addition, it is likely that the board is not subject to federal antitrust
law. Cf. United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 338 (1952).
371
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
reasonably?' The tort consists of (1) a concerted refusal to deal with an-
other which (2) harms his business and (3) is not justified under the cir-
cumstances."
The first element, either the concerted refusal to deal or the combina-
tion or conspiracy to reduce competition, is the illegal conduct against which
the court's relief is directed. Refusing to deal is a tort only when it is done by
agreement,13
 and a common law restraint of trade is a contract or conspiracy
to reduce competition?* Since refusing to deal with a businessman neces-
sarily reduces his competitive capacity and restrains trade to that extent,
combining to do so is conspiring to restrain trade." As for the second ele-
ment, the causes of action seem to diverge, because the injury of the tort is
to the individual's business, while the injury of a restraint of trade is to
the public. But the immediate injury to a plaintiff's business from a re-
duction of his competitive capacity is also an injury to the public's interest
in free competition. In fact, injury to a single competitor has been held
sufficient to establish a cause of action as a restraint of trade." For the
court to characterize the injury as both a restraint of trade and a tort is
merely an acknowledgment of the fact that business competitors and the
general public each have an interest requiring that a particular field be ac-
cessible on an equal basis to all qualified people. In any event, the courts'
treatment of the third element of each cause of action completely eliminates
any meaningful distinction between them.
The third element concerns the reasonableness of the restraint and the
justification for the refusal to deal. In each action this issue is determined
by a balancing of both public and private interests against the intended and
actual benefits or injuries. In a tort action, the effect on competition of a
refusal to deal is examined?r and, in restraint of trade, the courts evaluate
the degree of injury to private competitors." Thus, the conduct in question,
the interests to be considered, and the injury to be redressed are the same
no matter which theory is utilized.
11 6A Corbin, Contracts § 1379, at 30 (1962). Antitrust statutes have generally been
interpreted to embody the common law elements, so that statutory and common law
actions are essentially interchangeable. See United States v. Southeastern Underwriter's
Ass'n, 51 F. Supp. 712, 714 (N.D. Ga. 1943); Speegle v. Board of Fire Underwriters, 29
Cal. 2d 34, 44, 172 P.2d 867, 873 (1946).
12 iRestatement, Torts § 765 (1939).
ls Id. § 762(c). See Frank H. Gibson, Inc. v. Omaha Coffee Co., 179 Neb. 169, 179, 137
N.W.2d 701, 708 (1965); Barish v. Chrysler Corp., 141 Neb. 157, 164, 3 N.W.2d 91,
95 (1942); Nob v. Whitney, 62 N.E.2d 744, 756 (Ohio Ct. App. 1945).
14 See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 15 (1945); United States v.
Bausch & Lomb Co., 321 U.S. 707, 723 (1944); United States v. Colgate & Co., 250
U.S. 300, 307 (1919). But see Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 155
(1951) (combination not required if specific intent is to establish a monopoly).
15 American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519, 528 (1943); Eastern
States Retail Lumber Dealer's Ass'n v. United States, 243 U.S. 600, 614 (1914).
16 Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 213 (1959).
17 Restatement, Torts § 765(2)(e) (1939). See W. E. Anderson Sons v. Local 311,
Intl Bhd. of Teamsters, 156 Ohio St. 541, 560, 104 N.E.2d 22, 33 (1952).
18 Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., supra note 16, at 213; Klingel's
Pharmacy v. Sharp & Dohme, 104 Md. 218, 229, 64 All. 1029, 1030 (1906).
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The utility and necessity of the tort theory arises because of the gen-
eral rule at common law that only the attorney general can seek to enjoin
a restraint of trade. 19
 In jurisdictions which follow this rule, the tort theory
is the only basis for relief available to an injured competitor in his individual
capacity. Other jurisdictions have changed the common law regarding stand-
ing, and in these jurisdictions the tort theory is merely an alternative form
of relief 2 0
 Finally, in some jurisdictions, standing is conferred upon injured
competitors by an antitrust statute, and the tort action is rendered superflu-
ous.21
 Since the tort action adequately protects the interests of injured com-
petitors, it is submitted that it should be used in those jurisdictions which
retain the common law notion of restraint of trade. This would eliminate the
necessity of straining the common law to allow standing to an individual.
The third point in the court's decision—the reasonableness of the
board's conduct—involved the only real issue to be decided. This will be
true in most cases of exclusion from a private association: the mere involve-
ment of the association is proof of the combination or agreement; the refusal
to deal is proven by the plaintiff's exclusion; and, although the actual dam-
ages may be difficult to prove, the existence of some injury is unquestionable,
because the cause of action presupposes that membership is essential to the
plaintiff's business. Thus, proof that the defendants have agreed to refrain
from dealing with the plaintiff leaves the reasonableness of the boycott as
the only issue.
A case like Grillo is easily reduced to the single issue of reasonableness,
and this issue can be further reduced to a single question. Since the plaintiff
normally attacks only his exclusion from the association and not its exis-
tence, the court need only balance the benefit expected from the exclusion
with the individual's right to compete on an equal basis. And the only
justification which may be seriously advanced for restricting an individual's
right to compete is the prevention of incompetency, dishonesty, or generally
substandard conduct. 22
 The determination of these norms is ordinarily
.a legislative function, and therefore the question before the court should
be the desirability of permitting the private association to exercise this
power by economic sanctions.
On the facts of the instant case, the answer was obvious to the court.
The regulation of real estate brokers in New Jersey has been entrusted by
the legislature to the Real Estate Commission. 23 The commission has exclu-
19 Since Mogul S.S. Co. v. McGregor, 23 Q.E.D. 598 (CA. 1889), the general
rule in England and the United States has been that a competitor who is injured by
a restraint of trade has no standing to sue in the absence of malice toward his business.
Palmer v. Atlantic Ice & Coal Corp., 178 Ga. 405, 415, 173 S.E. 424, 429 (1934). Cf.
Downs v. Bennett, 63 Kan. 653, 660-61, 66 Pac. 623, 626 (1901).
20 See, e.g., Group Health Coop. v. King County Medical Soc'y, supra note 10, at 658,
237 P.2d at 775. See 32 B.U.L. Rev. 227 (1952). In Grillo, the court had some difficulty
in deciding to grant standing to the plaintiff. 91 N.J. Super. at 213-17, 219 A.2d at 641-44.
21 E.g., Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16750 (West 1964); Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 1331.08 (Baldwin 1964); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 79, § 25 (1961).
22 See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., supra note 7, at
658; Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 467 (1941).
23 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 45:15-17 to -29.5 (1963).
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sive jurisdiction over licenses and may withhold or confiscate them when-
ever necessary to protect the public from incompetency or unscrupulous con-
duct.24 Any private economic sanctioning of licensed brokers conflicts with
the commission's function and can only be unreasonable. The fact that
the plaintiff may have been guilty of misconduct, 25 or that the code of
ethics promulgated by the defendant board was more easily enforceable
than the statute," was immaterial. Any exercise of restrictive authority by
the board was unreasonable in the light of the commission's exclusive au-
thority as manifested by the comprehensive legislative scheme.
However, the court's reasoning that the exhaustive quality of the legis-
lation indicated a policy of exclusive regulation may be equally applicable
where there has been little or no legislation, for failure to legislate is often
held to be indicative of an intention that an area be left relatively uncon-
trolled." At any rate, failure to explicitly regulate should not be interpreted
as a mandate for private regulation, enforced by private economic reprisals,28
especially where the enforcer has a self-serving interest in restricting a com-
petitor's business." In addition, there are no procedural checks and no
judicial review of a private group's findings" unless a court is willing to
review individual exclusions on a case-by-case basis." The conclusion sug-
gested by Grillo is that no private association whose functions secure a com-
petitive advantage for its members should be allowed to withold these bene-
fits from others if it thereby maintains extra-governmental standards within
a field.
The impact of Grillo on New Jersey law can best be evaluated by
reference to Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Soc'y,32 a recent case
from the same jurisdiction, which concerns a similar problem. In that case,
the medical society had excluded a licensed physician from membership be-
cause he had not fulfilled its unwritten requirement of four-years attendance
at a medical school approved by the American Medical Association. Mem-
bership in the society was a prerequisite for acceptance to the staff of any
local hospital." The trial court found that membership was necessary to
24 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 45:15-17 (1963).
25 See note 4 supra.
26 Brief for Defendant, p. 8.
27 American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 130 F.2d 233, 249-50 (D.C. Cir. 1942),
aff 'd, 317 U.S. 519 (1943).
28 Cf. Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941) ;
Saveall v. Demers, 322 Mass. 70, 76 N.E.2d 12 (1947). But cf. Purofied Down Prods.
Corp v. National .Ass'n of Bedding Mfrs., 97 N.Y.S.2d 683 (Sup. Ct. 1950). See also
Note, Legal Responsibility for Extra-Legal Censure, 62 Colum. L. Rev. 475 (1962).
29 Interest alone is a significant factor in holding the restriction of competitors un-
reasonable. See Associated Press v. United States, supra note 14, at 26-27.
so Compare N.J. Stat. Ann. § 45:15-18 (1963).
37 New York courts have been willing to review exclusion from medical societies
on such a basis. See Ried v. Medical Soc'y, 156 N.Y. Supp. 780 (Sup. Ct. 1915). But the
origin of this practice lies in a statute, since repealed, which required physicians to be
members of a medical society. Note, 15 Rutgers L. Rev. 327, 333 n.30 (1961). See
People ex rel. Bartlett v. Medical Soc'y, 32 N.Y. (5 Tiff.) 187, 191 (1898). '
32 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791 (1961).
33 The County Medical Society was a member society in the AMA and adhered
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effectively practice medicine, and that the exclusion had no reasonable
relation to the society's legitimate attempts to promote higher standards of
ethics.34 The society was ordered to admit the plaintiff to full membership,
and the state supreme court affirmed.
Although Falcone and Grillo both uphold the individual's right to mem-
bership in a private association when such membership is essential to the
practice of a profession, they are significantly different in application. Fal-
cone established a policy of reviewing the exclusion on the basis of its rea-
sonableness, but the court in Grillo held that no exclusion could be reason-
able—that all licensed realtors must be permitted to participate in the listing
pool. The difference in policy shows a willingness by the court to accept
private regulation, otherwise unlawful as concerted action, based upon the
distinction between the nature of the professions involved.
In ordinary commercial matters there is little justification for private
restrictive measures. 35 In the learned professions, however, there are im-
portant interests to be promoted, even at the occasional expense of some
diminution in free competition." Some ethical considerations peculiar to
the individual professions are not present in ordinary commercial enter-
prise.37 The promotion of new techniques and ideas requires mutual trust
and understanding between professionals." There is also a tradition of
self-regulation and public service with which the courts hesitate to inter-
fere." Because of these extra considerations, the court in Falcone did not
apply the ordinary business law that was later applied in Grillo, but held
that the medical society possessed a fiduciary power of control exercisable
in a reasonable manner." In effect, Falcone transforms groups with such
a power into administrative bodies, for they are allowed to determine the
standards for physicians who will serve in the hospitals.'"
There are, then, two solutions to the problems presented by Grillo and
Falcone. If a court finds that legislative standards are intended to be ex-
clusive, it will enjoin any exercise of group authority. On the other hand,
if it determines that the state statute sets only minimum standards, it may
to its standards. In order to retain AMA accreditation, a hospital is restricted to the
appointment of AMA members on its staff. Id. at 587, 170 A.2d at 794.
34 62 N.J. Super. 184, 162 A.2d 324 (1960).
35 See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., supra note 7;
Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, supra note 28, at 467-68.
38 The learned professions have been excluded from the term "trade" for regulatory
purposes, since ordinary commercial competition is of little concern in the regulation
of the professions. Riggall v. Washington County Medical Soc'y, 249 F.2d 266, 270
(8th Cir. 1957); United States v. Oregon Medical Soc'y, 95 F. Supp. 103, 118 (D. Ore.
1950). The real estate profession, however, has been classified as "trade" for regulatory
purposes. United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485, 492 (1950).
37 Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608, 612 (1935).
38 See Harris v. Thomas, supra note 6, at 1077.
39 See Note, 63 Yale L.J. 937, 949, 959-61, 970-71, 976 (1954). For example, the
AMA has been instrumental in raising hospital standards. See Perr, Hospital Privileges
Revisited, 9 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 137, 146-147 (1960).
40 34 N.J. at 597, 170 A.2d at 799.
41 New Jersey has apparently accomplished judicially what New York had ac-
complished legislatively. See note 31 supra.
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hold that "it is desirable to have a central body to improve upon those
standards and to promulgate codes of practice and conduct." 42 The court's
sympathy with private regulatory programs should be in proportion to its
estimation of their value as applied by the particular profession involved.
This, in turn, should be determined by the degree to which considerations
other than control of competition motivate the learned professions to form
private associations and exercise their "administrative" power.
ROBERT ZIMMERMAN
Trade Regulation—Miller-Tydings Amendment—Redemption of Trad-
ing Stamps for Fair-Traded Goods.—Vornado, Inc. v. Corning Glass
Works?—Corning Glass Works is a manufacturer of household goods such
as the popularly known "Corning Ware." Vornado is a discount retail
company, selling food items and a wide range of other merchandise. Vornado
also operates its own trading stamp plan, issuing stamps on the sale of its
food items, and redeeming the filled stamp books for non-food items. Corning
required Vornado to execute a fair-trade agreement which included a mini-
mum price schedule. Vornado abided by this schedule on all cash sales of
Corning's products, but did not always so abide when selling them in exchange
for a combination of filled stamp books and cash. The actual value of this
combination was sometimes below the scheduled minimum price. 2 Corning
informed Vornado that this practice constituted a violation of their fair-
trade agreement, and insisted that Vornado cease such exchanges. Following
the latter's refusal to comply, Corning instructed its distributors to stop
supplying Corning's products to Vornado. Vornado subsequently instituted
this litigation in the United States District Court for New Jersey.
Vornado contended that its ability to engage in price competition was
reduced by Corning's retail price-fixing program, and that Corning's refusal,
in conceit with its distributors, to continue selling its products to Vornado
was a conspiracy in violation of the antitrust laws. Vornado claimed that
Corning's failure to subject trading stamp operations, other than Vornado's,
to resale price restrictions amounted to such discrimination as to remove
Corning from within the fair-trade exemption contained in the Miller-Tydings
Amendment to the Sherman Act. 2 Corning has never treated trading stamp
companies (e.g., Sperry & Hutchinson Company, Top Value Enterprises,
Inc., E. F. McDonald Stamp Company) as within the operation of its fair-
trade program. Nor has Corning regulated the number of filled stamp books
required to be exchanged for its products. The district court HELD • Corn-
ing's fair-trade agreement with Vornado was valid, and therefore Vornado
42 Note, 15 Rutgers L. Rev. 327, 356 (1961).
1 255 F. Supp. 216 (D.N.J. 1966).
2 For example, Vornado might offer a Corning product, having a fair-trade price
of $10.95, for $4.95 in cash and one filled stamp book normally valued at $2.25. The
total actual value of the stamp and cash combination would be $7.20. Id. at 222.
3 SO Stat. 693 (1937), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
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